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New Course "Hardware Trojan Detection and Prevention" will be Offered at UCONN by CHASE Faculty,  Prof. Domenic Forte, Spring 2014

Course Description: Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made to original IC designs that reduce system reliability and security (changes to functionality, leakage of private data, etc.). With the potential for ICs containing Trojans to end up in commercial or military systems, there has been substantial interest not only in academia, but also in governmental agencies and industry to detect and prevent Trojan insertion. ECE 6095 - 005 is a graduate-level advanced-topics course that intends to help students:
  • Understand the challenges and impact of hardware Trojans.
  • Familiarize themselves with existing state-of-the-art research in the area.
  • Build a foundation of knowledge in overlapping areas such as signal processing, detection, and estimation theories.
  • Evaluate existing methods, improve upon them, and develop new research techniques for hardware Trojan detection and prevention.
  • Improve reading, writing, and presentation skills.
Topics to Be Covered:
  • Basics of VLSI design, synthesis, fabrication, and test
  • Introduction to hardware Trojans, Trojan taxonomy, and mitigation taxonomy including destructive, design-time, test-time, and run-time
  • Systematic methods of Trojan insertion
  • Post-silicon detection of Trojans
    • Destructive: Reverse-engineering
    • Nondestructive: Functional tests
    • Nondestructive: Side-channel analysis
      • Test-time vs. run-time
      • Embedded sensors: timing, power, temperature
  • Pre-silicon detection/prevention of Trojans
    • Design-for-security (DFS) based methods for Trojan detection
    • Formal verification and Proof Carrying Code (PCC)
  • Signal Processing, Estimation, and Detection Theory
    • Filtering-based estimation: Kalman filter, Extended Kalman filter, Particle filter
    • Introduction to detection theory: Hypothesis Testing, Neyman Pearson Theorem, Minimum Probability of Error and Bayes Risk
    • Potential applications in Trojan problem

Mark Your Calendar!

CHASE Annual Workshop on Secure/Trustworthy Systems and Supply Chain Assurance will be held on April 9-10, 2014 at the University of Connecticut.

New Publication

The Paper "Path ORAM: An Extremely Simple Oblivious RAM Protocol" Co-authored by CHASE Faculty, Prof. Marten van Dijk, Received the Best Student Paper Award at the 2013 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

Path ORAM is an extremely simple Oblivious RAM protocol that obfuscates memory access patterns with a small amount of client storage. Partly due to its simplicity, Path ORAM is the most practical ORAM scheme known to date and has been adopted in the design of secure processors since its proposal. From a theoretical perspective, for block sizes bigger than ω(log^2 N) where N is the capacity of Path ORAM in number of blocks, Path ORAM is asymptotically better than the best known ORAM scheme with small client storage.

Read the paper here.

Authors:E. Stefanov, M. van Dijk
, E. Shi, C.W. Fletcher,L. Ren, X. Yu, and S. Devadas

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